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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 07/07/2011 Accident number: 711 
Accident time: 08:40 Accident Date: 27/05/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/2402/21188, 





Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 15/06/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 07/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
inadequate survey (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
File last changed: 14th September 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-16 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the Section Leader of [Demining group] DT-16. The accident occurred at 
08:40 hours on 27 May 2009 at the minefield number AF/2402/21188/MF 0322, located in 
Navy Deh village, Daman district of Kandahar province.                                                                                            
SUMMARY: 
MF # AF2402/21188/MF322 is an anti-personal mine contaminated task around Kandahar 
Airbase. During Russian invasion on Afghanistan a security belt of landmine was established 
by the government forces to secure the airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. MF 322 is 
one of the minefields covered in the above mentioned mine belt.   
On 27 May 2009 at 0840 hrs [the Victim] the section leader of [Demining group] DT-16 
entered to a mined area which was not covered in current MF, stepped on a mine and caused 
the accident. According to the investigation report the section leader left the site for admin 
area in order to bring painted rocks for the marking purpose, on the way back from the admin 
area he wanted to use the shortest way, entered to unsafe area and the accident occurred. 
He had taken off his PPE and visor. As a result of accident the victim has lost his left leg from 
below knee and got multiple injuries on his right leg and both hands. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Poor management of the team daily operations caused this accident. As the team leader did 
not have a complete sight of his team to control his personnel during the operations. 
Additionally deminers should paint the rocks in the site; there is no need to carry painted 
rocks from a distance of around 500 meters for the marking of clearance lanes. It is not the 
job of section leaders to carry painted rocks to the team, but they are assigned to conduct 
supervision throughout the operations period.   
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
[Demining group] operation is recommended to review the current capability of command 
group in the team and take necessary actions. [Demining group] management is also 
requested to come up with a management solution to this problem and present their plan of 
action to prevent such accident in the future. MACCA OPS department expects to hear from 
[Demining group] by no later than 22nd of June 2009 that: 
• identifies why the accident occurred 




Victim number: 896 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Hands; severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "the victim has lost his left leg from below 
knee and got multiple injuries on his right leg and both hands". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators state that the Victim was engaged in an activity that he should not have been 
doing – because he should have been supervising deminers. The cause may have been an 
Inadequate survey because it is likely that the Victim thought he was walking across a non 
hazardous area when the accident occurred. The area may have been a recorded hazardous 
area, in which case the field supervisors should have been told that there directly adjacent 
task areas. The failure to tell the demining group that there was a hazardous area alongside, 
(or for the group managers to tell its field supervisors that there was), is a serious 
Management Control Inadequacy, so this is the secondary cause assigned. 
The summary asks the demining group to identify a cause for the accident, and to identify the 
corrective measures needed. This implies that the investigators were relying on an “internal” 
investigation rather than making an independent investigation themselves. It is possible that 
the security situation at the time prevented the investigators from visiting the accident site. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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